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Abstract
This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation in which the players
l e a r nf r o mt h ee x p e r i m e n t so fo t h e r sa sw e l la st h e i ro w n . W e¯ r s te s t a b l i s ht h e
e±cient benchmark where the players co-ordinate in order to maximise joint ex-
pected payo®s, and then show that, because of free-riding, the strategic problem
leads to ine±ciently low levels of experimentation in any equilibrium when the
players use stationary Markovian strategies. E±ciency can be approximately re-
trieved provided that the players adopt strategies which slow down the rate at
which information is acquired; this is achieved by their taking periodic breaks
from experimenting, which get progressively longer. In the public information
case (actions and experimental outcomes are both observable), we exhibit a class
of non-stationary equilibria in which the "-e±cient amount of experimentation is
performed, but only in in¯nite time. In the private information case (only actions
are observable, not outcomes), the breaks have two additional e®ects: not only
do they enable the players to ¯nesse the inference problem, but also they serve to
signal their experimental outcome to the other player. We describe an equilibrium
with similar non-stationary strategies in which the "-e±cient amount of experi-
mentation is again performed in in¯nite time, but with a faster rate of information
acquisition. The equilibrium rate of information acquisition is slower in the former
case because the short-run temptation to free-ride on information acquisition is
greater when information is public.
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This paper describes a game of strategic experimentation in which the players learn from
the experimental outcomes of others as well as from their own. We contrast two possible
models, one where a player can directly observe her opponent's experimental outcomes
and a second where a player's ability to learn from others is limited, because experimen-
tal outcomes are private. In the latter case, a player can draw some inference about her
opponent's outcomes by studying the actions he takes. For example, when he uses one
action for a long time she can infer that this action is favourable without undertaking
a costly experiment herself, so when outcomes are private, his actions determine the
information he himself acquires and also how this information is signalled to the other
players. We ¯nd the following results in such games: ¯rst, a level of experimentation
which is approximately socially e±cient can be induced when the players have public or
private information provided the players use strategies which slowly acquire information.
For this to hold, it is important for players to take breaks in experimenting which not
only slow the rate of information acquisition but also signal information in the private
information case. We call these \co®ee breaks." Secondly, a move from public to pri-
vate information will generally increase the amount of experimentation the individuals
perform and the rate at which the information is acquired. The increase in the amount
is because of the delay in the inference about the opponent's outcomes when they are
private. The rate is slower under public information because the short-run temptation
to free-ride is greater in that case.
If the results of research are public and two players fund independent experiments,
then they are each providing a public good (information) to the other. They must decide
how long to continue providing this public good, given they have the option of free-riding
on the other's costly information, and the free-riding problem causes the players to under-
fund the acquisition of information. The benchmark case of strategic experimentation
with public information has been well examined by Bolton and Harris (1999), in a more
complex environment than that used in this paper.1 They consider a two-armed bandit
problem with Brownian noise; we consider a two-armed bandit problem with Poisson-
type uncertainty, and derive comparable results. These are of interest in their own right,
and are used as building blocks when we address the issue of non-stationary strategies
in the case ¯rst of public information and then of private information.
When there is public information there is an obvious state variable in this model {
the players' common belief { but there is no obvious state variable in the model with
private information because the players' beliefs are not commonly known and, in general,
the entire past history of her opponent's play is relevant in determining a player's belief
about her opponent's experimental outcomes. Thus, when we move from public to
private information it is necessary for us to consider equilibria where the players use
more complex history-dependent strategies. We wish to compare the history-dependent
equilibria that naturally arise in the game with private information with the equilibria
1They consider equilibria where the players use stationary Markovian strategies (with the common
`level of optimism' as the state variable) and show that, because players can immediately see each others'
outcomes and can adjust their actions to ensure an individually optimal rate of information acquisition,
there is an ine±cient amount of experimentation in models with public information.
1that arise in the game with public information, and it is not correct to compare these
history-dependent equilibria with the stationary Markovian equilibria of the game with
public information (otherwise we are changing both the class of strategies we allow
the players to use and a change in the information structure). Our benchmark should
be the outcomes of the game with public information where the players can also use
history-dependent strategies. However, because work has concentrated on equilibria of
the game where the players use stationary Markovian strategies, very little is known
about the equilibria of the game where the players can use more sophisticated actions.
Consequently, the ¯rst completely novel result in this paper describes equilibria in the
game with public information where the players use history-dependent strategies.
We ¯nd that, if experimental outcomes are public information, then there are (non-
stationary) equilibria that approach the e±cient level and rate of experimentation. These
equilibria are characterised by a gradual evolution of cooperation by the two players. The
players adjust the rate at which information is acquired, so that the future bene¯ts from
participating in the current round of experimentation always outweigh the current costs.
For this to happen it must be the case that the players never actually stop experimenting.
The equilibria we build divide continuous time into discrete intervals of length ¢. In
each interval the players begin by performing some experimentation, and then they stop
and use a safe action until the end of the interval. The amount they experiment in
each interval of length ¢ shrinks to zero, so the rate at which information is acquired
converges to zero. The experimentation is costly for the players and in the short run they
would rather use the safe action; however, if they fail to perform the experimentation
in any interval their opponent never experiments in the future. Thus there is a long-
run cost to not abiding by this strategy, because they forgo all the future information
that would be generated by their opponent's actions. Provided the strategy is carefully
chosen it is possible to make this long-run cost greater than any short-run gain from
deviation. It is important for the technical restrictions on strategies in continuous time
that players do not have to respond immediately after their opponent deviates. The
equilibrium construction does not rely on this { all a player needs to verify is that at
the end of the interval (of length ¢) her opponent experimented in the early part of
the interval. The reader will notice that two elements are essential for this equilibrium
to work: there must be an in¯nite time horizon and time must be continuous. If
there is a point in the future when the players will stop experimenting, then the long-
run bene¯ts vanish and the short-run costs force a player to stop experimenting now.
Thus this equilibrium can only survive if the long-run level of experimentation is never
actually attained. If time is discrete, then players can provide only discrete chunks of
information to their opponent at a strictly positive cost. This equilibrium requires the
players to make in¯nitely many arbitrarily small experiments at arbitrarily small cost
which is impossible in discrete time. This result is similar to those in dynamic models
of the private provision of public goods. It has been noted that an e±cient level of the
provision of the public good may be possible in the long run if the players are allowed to
gradually make smaller contributions (for example, Admati and Perry (1991), Marx and
Matthews (1997), Lockwood and Thomas (1999)) and the provision of the public good is
irreversible. In those models time is discrete and the players can continuously vary their
(irreversible) contributions to the public good. Information is a natural candidate for
those models { communicating information is clearly irreversible; however, no previous
2model has treated this explicitly.
Once the investigation of equilibria with public experimental outcomes is complete
we move on to studying the game with private experimental outcomes. First note that
because the co®ee breaks have a pre-determined length, the amount of time spent exper-
imenting in any interval is independent of the experimental outcomes, and so the players
cannot deduce anything from each other's actions during an activity phase. This breaks
the in¯nite regress of having beliefs about beliefs about ... . Next, when experimental
outcomes are private each player cannot immediately free-ride on the other's costly re-
search. Her ability to infer her opponent's outcomes is limited by the way his actions
signal his outcomes, so the rate of free-riding on experimental e®ort is endogenous. In
particular there is a delay in the players correctly interpreting their opponent's actions.
This delay in acquiring information from others leads one to expect there to be more
experimentation when the players have private information. Two general principles will
apply: (a) If a player observes her opponent engaged in research she will generally re-
vise her belief for successful experimentation upwards as time passes, even when she is
not using the action herself. (This, of course, assumes that her opponent will generally
choose to experiment more in favourable states of the world.) (b) If a player observes her
opponent switching from action R to action S,s a y ,h e rb e l i e ft h a ta c t i o nR is pro¯table
will move downwards. This is because her knowledge of her opponents strategy and the
timing of the switch will give her a lot of information about her opponent's experimen-
tal results before the switch. As an example of these processes consider an observer
monitoring the behaviour of an individual experimenting with Brownian motion with an
uncertain drift, as in Berry and Fristedt (1985, Chapter 8). While the individual uses
the risky action, knowledge of the optimal experimental strategy would lead an outside
observer to revise upwards her belief for a high drift. The time at which the experimenter
moves from the Brownian motion stream to the safe pro¯t stream, when combined with
knowledge of the experimenter's (deterministic) strategy, gives the observer all the rel-
evant information from the experiments { without having to perform the experiments
herself! In general, these two methods of extracting information from an opponent's ex-
perimental strategy will be very e®ective in uncovering information about an opponent's
experimental results. However, unlike the case of direct observation of experimental
results, an outside observer will not be able to extract accurate information about ex-
perimental results immediately. It is this delay in obtaining accurate information (and
the consequent delay in free-riding on others' information provision) that generally in-
creases the amount of experimentation performed in games of strategic experimentation
with private information, because players can overcome this delay by experimenting more
on their own account.
Two types of dynamic signalling device arise in models with private experimental
outcomes. The ¯rst is called the \co®ee break" mechanism, which arises if both re-
searchers simultaneously take short pre-determined \co®ee breaks" from using the risky
action if they have been unsuccessful. If a player does not show up for co®ee then the
other deduces that he has been successful and revises her belief accordingly. This sort
of dynamic signalling is self-enforcing if the co®ee breaks are su±ciently short { neither
player bene¯ts by lying and thereby convincing her opponent that the state is good,
because if she does this she will get no more information from her opponent. (In fact
3each player would be willing to pay a small cost to be able to truthfully signal by taking
a co®ee break.) As the players can take breaks very often, the co®ee break equilibrium
can be used to construct games where players signal their information very frequently.
This provides a class of equilibria for the game of strategic experimentation with private
information which approximate the equilibria of games of strategic experimentation with
public information.
The second type of signalling device (not considered further in this paper) arises when
the players alternate in their experimentation, so that one player experiments whilst the
other does not and then they switch roles; but a player continues experimenting if she
has been successful. Thus, if the players continue to alternate, their actions reveal their
private information at discrete points in time, and if the alternation is frequent the
asymmetry in the agents' information is also reduced. Thus alternating experimentation
is an e®ective dynamic signalling device. In the limit the players' actions will \chatter"
and this chattering approximates perfect communication.
Section 2 is expository: it sets up a simple bandit model and describes the optimal
strategy. We establish the e±cient benchmark where the players co-ordinate in order to
maximise joint expected payo®s, and then show that, because of free-riding, the strategic
problem leads to ine±ciently low levels of experimentation in any equilibrium when the
players use stationary Markovian strategies. The completely novel results of the paper
appear in Sections 3 and 4, where we introduce the co®ee breaks and consider non-
stationary equilibria in which the "-e±cient amount of experimentation is performed,
¯rst in the case of public information, and then in the case of asymmetric information
when experimental outcomes are private. In Section 5 we discuss whether the results
can be extended to more elaborate models. Some of the proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 Poisson Bandits
The purpose of this section is to describe the solution to a simple, continuous-time two-
armed bandit problem. One arm S is `safe' and yields a known deterministic °ow payo®
whenever it is played; the other arm R is `risky' and can be either `bad' or `good'. If
it is bad, then it always yields 0; if it is good, then it yields a known lump-sum reward
at random times whenever it is played { the lump-sums arriving according to a Poisson
process. We assume that the agent strictly prefers R,i fi ti sg o o d ,t oS, and strictly
prefers S to R, if it is bad, so she has a motive to experiment with the risky action in
the hope of discovering that R is indeed good. The problem she faces, however, is that
when she plays R s h ec a n n o ti m m e d i a t e l yt e l lw h e t h e ri ti sg o o do rb a d ,b e c a u s ei n
either case she initially receives no payo® at all, and the longer she waits without getting
a lump-sum, the less optimistic she becomes. Of course, if she does eventually receive a
lump-sum then she becomes certain that R is good and she will continue with R forever,
but if she waits and waits without the lump-sum arriving then there will come a time
when it is optimal for her to cut her losses and switch irrevocably to S.
More formally, time t 2 [0;1) is continuous, and the discount rate is r>0. The
4known °ow payo® of the safe arm is s;t h ek n o w nlump-sum payo® of the risky arm
if it is good is h, the parameter of the Poisson process which determines the arrival of
the lump-sums is ¸, and so the expected payo® from a good arm is equivalent to a °ow
payo® of ¸h.W ea s s u m et h a t0<s<¸ h .
If an agent plays S over a period of time dt then her payo® is sdt, and if she plays R
over this period then her expected payo® is ¸¹dt,w h e r e¹ 2f 0;hg is unknown. Thus, if k
indicates her current choice between S (k =0 )a n dR (k = 1), then her expected current
payo® (conditional on the unknown state ¹ of the risky arm) is [(1 ¡ k)s + k¸¹] dt.H e r





¡rt [(1 ¡ kt)s + kt¸¹] dt j p0
¸
;
which expresses the payo® in per-period terms. Of course, this choice of strategy is
subject to the constraint that the action taken at any time t be measurable with respect
to the information available at that time.
Let pt denote the subjective probability at time t that the agent assigns to the risky
arm being good, so that pt¸h is her current expectation of the °ow equivalent of playing





¡rt [(1 ¡ kt)s + ktpt¸h] dt j p0
¸
:
This highlights the potential for beliefs to serve as a state variable.
Were an agent to act myopically over a period of time dt, she would weigh the short-
run payo® from playing S, rsdt, against what she expects from playing R, rp¸hdt.S o






For p>p m it is myopically optimal to play R;f o rp<p m it is myopically optimal to play
S. As we shall see below, a forward-looking agent (who values information) continues to
play R for some beliefs p<p m,a n di ss a i dt oexperiment.
We shall consider the cases where there is a single agent, where there are N agents
playing as a team, and where there are N players who act strategically but use only
Markovian strategies with the state variable being the belief p.
2.1 The single-agent problem
When S is played over a period of time dt, the belief does not change. When R is played
over a period of time dt, the lump-sum h arrives with probability ¸dtif the risky arm is
good,2 and the posterior belief jumps to 1; no payo® arrives with probability 1 ¡ ¸dtif
the risky arm is good, and with probability 1 if the risky arm is bad. If the agent starts
2This is up to terms of the order o(dt) ,w h i c hw ec a ni g n o r eh e r ea n di nw h a tf o l l o w s .
5with the belief p,p l a y sR over a period of time dt and does not obtain a reward, then
the updated belief at the end of that time period is
p + dp =
p(1 ¡ ¸dt)
1 ¡ p + p(1 ¡ ¸dt)
by Bayes' rule. Simplifying, we see that the belief changes by
dp = ¡¸p(1 ¡ p)dt:
We now derive the agent's Bellman equation. By the Principle of Optimality, the
agent's value function satis¯es
u(p)= m a x
k2f0;1g
n
r [(1 ¡ k)s + k¸hp] dt+ e
¡rd tE[u(p + dp) j p0]
o
where the ¯rst term is the expected current payo® and the second term is the discounted
expected continuation payo®.
As to the expected continuation payo®, with subjective probability pk¸dt the lump-
s u ma r r i v e sa n dt h ea g e n te x p e c t sa° o wp a y o ®o f¸h in the future; with probability
p(1¡k¸dt)+(1¡p)=1¡pk¸dt no lump-sum arrives and she expects u(p)+u0(p)dp =
u(p) ¡ k¸p(1 ¡ p)u0(p)dt.
Using 1¡rd tto approximate e¡rd t, we see that her discounted expected continuation
payo® is
(1 ¡ rdt) fu(p)+k¸p[¸h ¡ u(p) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u
0(p)]dtg
and so her expected total payo® is
u(p)+r f(1 ¡ k)s + k¸hp+ k¸p[¸h ¡ u(p) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u
0(p)]=r ¡ u(p)gdt:
When this is maximised it equals u(p). Simplifying and rearranging, we thus obtain the
Bellman equation
u(p)= m a x
k2f0;1g
f(1 ¡ k)s + k¸hp+ k¸p[¸h ¡ u(p) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u
0(p)]=rg :
Note that the maximand is a±ne in k, and that the agent is indi®erent between the two
options when s¡¸hp = ¸p[¸h¡u(p)¡(1¡p)u0(p)]=r, each option resulting in u(p)=s.
Thus she is e®ectively unrestricted by the discrete nature of her choice; as usual, there
is no scope for randomisation in this single-agent decision problem.
So, when it is optimal to play S (k¤ =0 ) ,u(p)=s as one would expect; and when
it is optimal to play R (k¤ =1 ) ,u satis¯es the ¯rst-order ODE
¸p(1 ¡ p)u
0(p)+( r + ¸p)u(p)=( r + ¸)¸hp; (1)
which has the solution






with C being the constant of integration.






(r + ¸)(¸h ¡ s)+rs
<p
m (3)
such that below the cut-o® it is optimal to play S and above it is optimal to play R.T h e
value function V ¤
1 for the single-agent is given by
V
¤


















1,a n dV ¤
1 (p)=s otherwise.
Proof: The expression for p¤
1 is derived by using the values u(p¤
1)=s and u0(p¤
1)=0i n
equation (1). Note that for any solution u of equation (1), at any p such that u(p)=s,
it is the case that u0(p) < 0i fp<p ¤
1 and that u0(p) > 0i fp>p ¤
1.
Playing S when p 2 [0;p ¤
1)g i v e sap a y o ®o fs;s i n c eV ¤
1 (p)=s on that interval,
playing R on any interval to the left of p¤
1 would give a payo® less than s and is therefore
sub-optimal. Playing R when p 2 (p¤
1;1] gives a payo® greater than s;p l a y i n gS on any
interval to the right of p¤
1 would give a payo® of s and is therefore also sub-optimal.
Using V ¤
1 (p¤
1)=s in equation (2) determines the constant of integration C,g i v i n g
the expression for V ¤
1 .
This solution exhibits all of the familiar properties, which were elegantly described in
Rothschild (1974): the optimal strategy has a threshold where the experimenter switches
irrevocably from R to S; there are occasions where the experimenter makes a mistake
by switching from R to S although the risky action is actually better (R is good); the
probability of mistakes decreases as the experimenter becomes more patient, and as the
expected reward from the risky action increases.
2.2 The N-agent team problem
Now suppose that there are N ¸ 2 identical agents (same prior belief, same discount
rate), each with identical two-armed bandits, who are working as a team, i.e. they want
to maximise the average expected payo®. Information is public: the players can observe
each other's actions and outcomes, so the players' beliefs remain identical throughout
time.
If K of them play R over a period of time dt, then, if a lump-sum arrives they
all switch to R else their belief decays K-times as fast. Whenever that arm is good,
the probability of none of them getting a lump-sum is (1 ¡ ¸dt)K =1¡ K¸dt,t h e
probability of exactly one of them getting a lump-sum is K¸dt(1 ¡ ¸dt)K¡1 = K¸dt,
and the probability of more than one of them getting a lump-sum is negligible.3
3Again, we are ignoring terms of order o(dt).
7Lemma 2.1 In the N-agent team problem, it is optimal either for all players to play R
or for none of them to do so.
Proof: Let u be the value function for the team problem, expressed as average pay-
o® per team member. When the current belief is p and the current choice is for K








dt.P a r a l -
leling the calculation for the single-agent problem, we see that the discounted expected
continuation payo® is
(1 ¡ rdt) fu(p)+K¸p[¸h ¡ u(p) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u
0(p)]dtg











Thus the value function satis¯es the Bellman equation











Note that the maximand is a±ne in K, and that the team is indi®erent between all levels
of K when s¡¸hp = N¸p[¸h¡u(p)¡(1¡p)u0(p)]=r, all of them resulting in u(p)=s.
Thus at all beliefs either K¤ = N or K¤ = 0 is optimal.
So, when it is optimal for them all to play S, u(p)=s as usual; and when it is
optimal for them all to play R, u satis¯es
N¸p(1 ¡ p)u
0(p)+( r + N¸p)u(p)=( r + N¸)¸hp (5)
which is like equation (1) with ¸ replaced by N¸ (re°ecting an N-times faster rate
of information acquisition), and h replaced by h=N (re°ecting the fact that lump-sum
rewards are shared amongst the N team members). This has the solution
















such that below the cut-o® it is optimal for all to play S and above it is optimal for all
to play R. The value function V ¤
N for the N-agent team is given by
V
¤


















N,a n dV ¤
N(p)=s otherwise.
8Proof: As in the proof of Proposition 2.1, p¤
N is determined by setting u(p¤
N)=s and
u0(p¤
N) = 0 in equation (5). Determining the constant of integration C as before gives
the expression for V ¤
N.
The above proposition determines the e±cient experimentation strategies for N play-
ers acting as a team. We can distinguish two aspects of e±ciency here. Given a strategy





the overall amount of time that a risky arm was used. We will call this number the amount
of experimentation that is performed. On the other hand, the sum Kt =
PN
n=1kn;t mea-
sures how many risky arms are used at a given time t. We will call this number the
intensity of experimentation.
Proposition 2.2 shows that the e±cient amount of experimentation is N times the
time it takes for the agents' common belief to decay to p¤
N when all players use the
risky arm all the way through. A simple calculation shows that for priors p0 >p ¤
N







p0 ]=¸. The e±cient intensity of experimentation
exhibits a bang-bang feature, being N when the current belief is above p¤
N, and 0 when
it is below. Thus, the e±cient intensity is maximal at early stages, and minimal later
on.
As we shall see next, equilibria of the N-player strategic problem are never e±cient.
Although it is possible to generate the e±cient amount of experimentation in such an
equilibrium, the intensity of experimentation will always be ine±cient because of each
player's incentive to free-ride on the e®orts of the others.
2.3 The N-player strategic problem { pure strategies
We continue to assume that the players have the same prior belief, the same discount
rate, identical two-armed bandits, and that information is public. We consider stationary
Markovian pure strategies with the common belief as the state variable. Our concise
treatment largely re°ects the approach taken in Bolton and Harris (1993, 1999).4
Let kn 2f 0;1g indicate the current choice of player n between S (kn =0 )a n dR
(kn =1 ) ;l e tK =
PN
n=1kn and K:n = K ¡ kn,s ot h a tK:n summarises the current
choices of the other players. Taking into account the information generated if the other
players play R, we see that player n's value function satis¯es the Bellman equation
un(p)= m a x
kn2f0;1g
f(1 ¡ kn)s + kn¸hp+( kn + K:n)¸p[¸h ¡ un(p) ¡ p(1 ¡ p)u
0
n(p)]=rg :
Immediately we see that the best response, k¤
n(p), is determined by comparing the op-








=0 i fs ¡ ¸hp > ¸p[¸h ¡ un(p) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u0
n(p)]=r ;
2f 0;1g if s ¡ ¸hp = ¸p[¸h ¡ un(p) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u0
n(p)]=r ;
=1 i fs ¡ ¸hp < ¸p[¸h ¡ un(p) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u0
n(p)]=r :
4The reader is referred to this work for a careful and detailed description of many stationary Markov
equilibria in the case where the agents sample Brownian motion with an unknown drift.
9If the best response is to play R (k¤
n =1 )t h e np l a y e rn's value function un satis¯es
K¸p(1 ¡ p)u
0(p)+( r + K¸p)u(p)=( r + K¸)¸hp (9)
with K = K:n +1 . 5 The solution to (9) is






If the best response is to free-ride by playing S (k¤
n =0 )t h e nun satis¯es
K¸p(1 ¡ p)u
0(p)+( r + K¸p)u(p)=rs+ K¸
2hp (11)










Finally, for K:n > 0, player n is indi®erent if and only if un(p)=s + K:n(s ¡ ¸hp).
Note that the equation u =( K +1 ) s ¡ K¸hp de¯nes a diagonal line DK in the (p;u)-
plane which cuts the safe payo® line u = s at p = pm, the myopic switch-point. If the
graphs of FK:n and VK:n+1 meet DK:n a tt h es a m eb e l i e fpc then F 0
K:n(pc)=V 0
K:n+1(pc),
which is a manifestation of the usual smooth-pasting property.
2.4 The N-player strategic problem { ine±ciency
Using the above results, we can now show the following.
Proposition 2.3 All Markov Perfect Equilibria of the N-player strategic game are in-
e±cient.
Proof: All we need to show is that the e±cient strategies from Proposition 2.2 are not
an equilibrium. Suppose therefore that players 1;:::;N¡ 1 use the risky arm at beliefs
above the cut-o® p¤
N and the safe arm below. If player N adopts the same strategy, her
payo® function is V ¤
N. If, for some ²>0, she deviates by switching to S on the interval
]p¤
N;p ¤
N + ²], the restriction of her payo® function uN to this interval solves (11) with
uN(p¤










N)=( N ¡ 1)¸p
¤
N(¸h ¡ s) > 0:
5Note that equation (9) for the strategic problem is the same ODE as that for the team problem
with K players; cf. equation (5). To see why, suppose that the risky arm is good. Then, whenever
K agents play the risky arm, a lump-sum arrives with probability K¸dt over the next instant. In the
K-agent team problem, this lump-sum is shared amongst K players, so the expected lump-sum reward
over the next instant is h
KK¸dt = h¸dt per player. In the strategic problem, the lump-sum arrives
with probability ¸dton player n's arm and with probability (K ¡ 1)¸dton someone else's arm. Since
player n keeps her own lump-sum in full and receives no share of someone else's, her expected lump-sum






N) > (V ¤
N)0(p¤
N) = 0, the deviation is clearly
pro¯table for beliefs su±ciently close to p¤
N.( I n f a c t , b y c h o o s i n g ² su±ciently small,
player N can achieve a payo® function uN >V¤
N on the whole of ]p¤
N;1[ .)
Thus, the incentive to free-ride on the experimentation e®orts of the other players
makes it impossible to reach e±ciency. In the following two subsections, we turn to
the question as to what can be achieved in Markov perfect equilibria. We shall consider
symmetric mixed strategy equilibria of the N-player game and asymmetric pure strategy
equilibria of the 2-player game. In Section 3, we shall then show that equilibria in non-
stationary strategies can come arbitrarily close to e±ciency.
2.5 The N-player strategic problem { symmetric MPE
Since the e±cient strategy pro¯le is symmetric and Markovian with the belief as state
variable, it is natural to ask what outcomes can be achieved in symmetric Markovian
equilibria of the N-player game. We maintain the assumptions of the previous sub-
sections, but allow for mixed strategies now. Following Bolton and Harris (1999), we
actually consider the time-division game in which agent n allocates a fraction ·n of the
current period [t;t + dt)t oR, and the remainder to S; this is isomorphic to the player
using the mixed strategy that places probability ·n on playing R, and the remainder on
S.
So, let ·n 2 [0;1] indicate the current decision of player n, K =
PN
n=1 ·n,a n d
K:n = K ¡ ·n. Once again taking into account the information generated by the other
players, we see that player n's value function satis¯es the Bellman equation
un(p)= m a x
·n2[0;1]
f(1 ¡ ·n)s + ·n¸hp +( ·n + K:n)¸p[¸h ¡ un(p) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u
0
n(p)]=rg :
Again the best response, ·¤
n(p), is determined by comparing the opportunity cost of








=0 i fs ¡ ¸hp > ¸p[¸h ¡ un(p) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u0
n(p)]=r ;
2 [0;1] if s ¡ ¸hp = ¸p[¸h ¡ un(p) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u0
n(p)]=r ;
=1 i fs ¡ ¸hp < ¸p[¸h ¡ un(p) ¡ (1 ¡ p)u0
n(p)]=r :
In any Markov perfect equilibrium player n's value function will be de¯ned piecewise:
when all the time is devoted to S it satis¯es equation (11) with K = K:n and is of the
form FK:n;w h e na l lt h et i m ei sd e v o t e dt oR it satis¯es equation (9) with K = K:n +1
and is of the form VK:n+1; and when the time is divided strictly between S and R it
satis¯es
¸p(1 ¡ p)u
0(p)+¸pu(p)=( r + ¸)¸hp ¡ rs; (13)












+ C (1 ¡ p): (14)
Note that when K:n > 0, player n is indi®erent if and only if (p;Wn(p)) 2D K:n;a n di f
the graphs of Wn and VK:n+1 meet DK:n at the same belief pc then W 0
n(pc)=V 0
K:n+1(pc).
11Our next result describes the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of the




denote the `odds ratio' corresponding to the belief p.
Proposition 2.4 (N players, symmetric strategies) In the N-player time-division
game with public information, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in Markovian
strategies with the common posterior belief as the state variable. In this equilibrium, all
time is devoted to the safe arm at beliefs below the single-player cut-o® p¤
1; all time is































and a positive fraction of time is devoted to each arm at beliefs strictly between p¤
1 and
































Proof: Suppose that all N players using the Markov strategy · :[ 0 ;1] ! [0;1]
constitutes an equilibrium of the time-division game with common value function u.L e t
pc =i n f fp 2 [0;1] : u(p) >s g,s ot h a tu(p)=s and ·(p)=0o n[ 0 ;p c], and u(p) >s
and ·(p) > 0o n] pc;1]. It is easy to see that pc · p¤
1,f o ri fw eh a dpc >p ¤
1,i tw o u l db e
a pro¯table deviation to switch from S to R on the interval ]p¤
1;p c[.
On the interval ]pc;1[ the value function satis¯es an ODE that is a combination of
(13) to the left of DN¡1 and (9) with K = N to the right of DN¡1. Relevant to us are
all solutions of this ODE whose graphs in the (p;u)-plane lie in the triangle with corners
(0;s), (pm;s)a n d( 1 ;¸h). It is straightforward to see that all these solutions can be
parameterised by the point where they cross the diagonal DN¡1 and that, depending on
this point, two possibilities arise: either the solution stays strictly above the level s or it
reaches this level. Exactly one solution has a point of tangency with the level s;l e tp0
c
be the corresponding belief. All other solutions that reach the level s coming down and
to the left from DN¡1 do so at a belief to the right of p0
c. Thus, the cut-o® pc that we
de¯ned for the equilibrium value function satis¯es p0
c · pc · p¤
1.
Now, p0
c is determined by setting u(p0
c)=s and u0(pc) = 0 in the ODE (13). As this
equation di®ers from (1) only by having s instead of u(p), it is immediate that p0
c = p¤
1,
the single-player cut-o® given in Proposition 2.1. This in turn proves that pc = p¤
1.
12Finally, using W(p¤
1)=s in equation (14) determines the constant of integration C,
giving the expression (16) for the value function over the range where both actions are
used for a positive fraction of time. Given this function, the expression (15) for the share
of time ·¤ allocated to R follows from each player's Bellman equation and (13). As W ¤
is strictly convex, ·¤ is strictly increasing to +1 as p " pm. Thus there is a unique
cut-o® ~ pN <p m where ·¤(~ pN) = 1. Simplifying W ¤(~ pN) ¡ s =( N ¡ 1)(s ¡ ¸h~ pN)g i v e s
the equation satis¯ed by ~ pN.
Several points are noteworthy. First, the lower cut-o® belief at which all experimen-
tation in the symmetric MPE stops does not depend on the number of players; quite
surprisingly, it equals the optimal cut-o® from the single-player problem. This means
that we do not have the encouragement e®ect of Bolton and Harris (1999). In their
model, an agent who on his own would be indi®erent between the two actions, strictly
prefers the risky action when other players are present. In fact, his own experimenta-
tion may produce favourable information that will make everybody more optimistic, and
thus encourage the other players to perform some more experimentation themselves from
which the ¯rst player will eventually bene¯t. Note that it is crucial for this argument
that there be a su±ciently good chance for beliefs to become more optimistic over the
next instant. This is the case in Bolton and Harris' framework where changes in beliefs
are driven by the increments of a Wiener process, so that the chance of an upward revi-
sion of beliefs over a short time interval stays bounded away from zero even as the length
of this interval shrinks to zero. With our Poisson bandits, beliefs can only become more
optimistic if a success occurs, and the chance of this happening over a given time interval
goes to zero with the length of the interval.6 Almost surely, beliefs an instant later will
be more pessimistic, so there is no hope that an extra bit of experimentation might be
reciprocated by the other players.
Second, the expected equilibrium payo® that each player obtains at beliefs where
both arms are used a positive fraction of time does not depend on the number of players
either; cf. equation (16). The reason for this is that the relevant ODE, equation (14), is
just the indi®erence condition of a single player, and that the boundary condition at the
lower cut-o® belief is the same for any number of players. Put di®erently, the combined
intensity of experimentation by N¡1 players when both arms are used a positive fraction
of time is independent of the total number of players, N; cf. equation (15). Over that
range of beliefs, therefore, a player's best response and payo® do not depend on N either.
What does depend on N is the upper cut-o® belief, of course: with more players, the
temptation to free-ride becomes stronger, and ~ pN increases. Formally, this is most easily
seen from equation (15): given that ·¤(~ pN)=1a n dW ¤ is a strictly increasing function,
~ pN must increase with N. Informally, the indi®erence diagonal DN¡1 rotates clockwise
as N increases.
Third, the proposition implies that there is no symmetric MPE in pure strategies.
In fact, any candidate for such an equilibrium unravels because of free-riding at lower
beliefs. What sort of behaviour can arise in a pure-strategy MPE will be addressed next.
For ease of exposition, we restrict ourselves to the two-player case from now on.
6Technically speaking, the di®erence is that the belief process in Bolton and Harris (1999) is of
in¯nite variation, while ours is of ¯nite variation.
132.6 The 2-player strategic problem - pure-strategy equilibria
We will present two types of asymmetric Markov perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.
The ¯rst type of MPE consists of strategies where the action of each player switches at
¯nitely many beliefs. As a consequence, there is a last point in time at which any player
is willing to experiment. As in the symmetric MPE, the belief at which this happens
(provided no success has been observed) will be the single-player cut-o® p¤
1.S ot h es a m e
ine±ciency arises: both the amount and the intensity of experimentation are too low.
In the second type of MPE, each player's strategy has in¯nitely many switching
points, and although there is a ¯nite time after which no player ever experiments again,
no single player has a last time for experimentation. That is, immediately prior to
reaching a certain cut-o® belief, the players switch roles increasingly fast, and in¯nitely
often. We will see that we can take this cut-o® belief to be the e±cient cut-o® p¤
2 that
would be chosen by a two-player team. Still, the equilibrium is ine±cient: although
the e±cient amount of experimentation is performed, it is performed with an ine±cient
intensity.
With ¯nitely many beliefs at which a player changes his action, a Markov perfect
equilibrium has three phases. When the players are optimistic (p>¹ pr), both play R;
when they are pessimistic (p · p¤
1), both play S; in between, one of them free-rides
by playing S while the other is playing R. This mid-range of beliefs further splits into
two regions. The roles of free-rider and `lone ranger' are assigned for the whole of the
upper region (p>¹ p`); in the lower region (p · ¹ p`), players can swap roles. Note that
the lower threshold belief at which all experimentation stops is the single-agent cut-o®;
in particular, it is the same for all equilibria of this type, whereas the higher threshold
beliefs are determined endogenously by how the burden of experimentation is shared in
the lower region ]p¤
1; ¹ p`].
The proposition below ¯rst describes the `simplest' such equilibrium, in which one
particular player experiments and the other free-rides throughout the lower region. This
equilibrium exhibits the least amount of experimentation, in that the part of the state
space where both players experiment is smallest, i.e. the high threshold is as close to




Proposition 2.5 (Two players, pure strategies, ¯nite number of switches)
In the two-player strategic experimentation problem with public information, there is a
pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibrium where the players' actions depend as follows on
the common posterior belief. There are three cut-o® beliefs p¤
1 < ~ p` < ~ pr such that: on
(~ pr;1], both players play R;o n(~ p`; ~ pr], player 1 plays R and player 2 plays S;o n(p¤
1; ~ p`],
player 1 plays S and player 2 plays R;o n[0;p ¤
1],t h e yb o t hp l a yS. The low cut-o®, p¤
1,





































Moreover, in any pure-strategy MPE with ¯nitely many switching points there are
three cut-o® beliefs p¤
1 < ¹ p` · ¹ pr, with ~ p` · ¹ p` and ¹ pr · ~ pr,s u c ht h a t :o n(¹ pr;1], both
players play R; throughout (¹ p`; ¹ pr], one player plays R and the other plays S;o n(p¤
1; ¹ p`],
the players share the burden of experimentation; on [0;p ¤
1],t h e yb o t hp l a yS.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Note that in the `simplest' and, at the same time, `worst' equilibrium (with cut-o®s
p¤
1,~ p` and ~ pr) the player who uses the risky arm longer has the lower expected payo®.
As the burden of experimentation is shared more and more equally in the lower region
of the mid-range of beliefs, the upper region of this range shrinks { we approach payo®
symmetry but not the payo®s of the 2-player symmetric MPE of Proposition 2.4, since
here the fraction of time each player allocates to the risky arm approaches
1
2 for the
entire region of strict mixing.
If we allow players to switch between actions at in¯nitely many beliefs, they can take
turns experimenting in such a way that no player ever has a last time (or lowest belief)
at which he is supposed to use the risky arm. Surprisingly, it is possible to reach cut-o®
beliefs below p¤
1 in such an equilibrium. In fact, it is possible to attain the e±cient cut-o®
p¤
2, but it is reached too slowly.
Proposition 2.6 (Two players, pure strategies, in¯nite number of switches)










such that the following pure strategies constitute a Markov perfect equilibrium of the two-
player strategic experimentation problem with public information: on ]p¤





i], player 1 plays R and player 2 plays S if i is even, whereas player
1p l a y sS and player 2 plays R if i is odd; on [0;p ¤
2], they both play S.
Proof: To be added.







p0 ]=¸, which is the e±cient amount according to our
remark after Proposition 2.2. However, the intensity of experimentation is e±cient only
at times before p¤
1 and after p¤
2 is reached; at times in between, it is 1, and therefore ¯rst
too low, then too high relative to the e±cient benchmark.
153 Non-Stationary Equilibria with Public Informa-
tion
We will now move on to describing a class of equilibria where the players do not use
Markovian strategies. There are three main reasons for doing this. The ¯rst is that we
are interested in comparing equilibria of the game with public information to equilibria
of the game with private information. In the game with private information there are
no natural state variables, so we are obliged to consider equilibria where the players use
strategies that are more complex and history-dependent. To make a fair comparison,
therefore, we ought to consider equilibria of the game with public information when the
players are able to use more sophisticated strategies. The second reason is that the
equilibria we construct for games with private information have a natural analogue in
games with public information, so we would be remiss in not describing these. Thirdly,
models of strategic experimentation with public information are essentially models of
private provision of public goods and there is already a literature on this topic showing
that non-Markovian strategies are useful in generating e±ciency.7
Focusing on the two-player case, we construct a family of equilibria of the experimen-
tation game with public information where, through the use of non-Markovian strategies,
players achieve payo®s arbitrarily close to the e±cient level given by the team solution.
On the equilibrium path the players will both use action R as long as their common
belief satis¯es p ¸ p¤
1. When their common belief is below p¤
1, time is partitioned into
a sequence of ¯nite intervals of equal length (except possibly for the very ¯rst interval,
which can be shorter if the player's belief at the beginning of the game is already below
p¤
1). On the equilibrium path, both players experiment during the ¯rst part of each in-
terval; if, during that time, no player has received a reward, both players take a \co®ee
break" from using the risky arm during the remaining part of the interval. The length
of the breaks is strictly bounded away from zero and grows from interval to interval,
expanding in such a way that the players' belief cannot reach the e±cient cut-o® p¤
2 in
¯nite time. A deviation from the risky to the safe arm during the ¯rst part of such an
interval is deterred by the opponent's credible threat never to use the risky arm again.
The notation used to describe this non-stationary equilibrium is as follows. The
length of the time intervals that come into play at beliefs below p¤
1 is ¢ > 0. The ith
interval (i =0 ;1;2;:::) consists of an \activity phase" of length ai followed by a break
of length bi =¢¡ ai.W ei m p o s ea nu p p e rb o u n d¹ a<¢o nt h ee x p e r i m e n t a t i o nt i m e ,
which means a lower bound on the length of the co®ee breaks.
The sequence of intervals with their activity phases and co®ee breaks leads to a
decreasing sequence of beliefs ^ pi (i =0 ;1;:::) that, as long as no success is observed, are
reached consecutively on the equilibrium path. We anchor this sequence at the one-player
cut-o® by setting ^ p0 = p¤
1. We then de¯ne recursively:
^ pi+1 =
^ pi exp(¡2¸ai)
1 ¡ ^ pi +^ pi exp(¡2¸ai)
:
Thus, if the players enter the ith activity phase with belief ^ pi and both use the risky
7E.g., Marx and Matthews (1997).
16arm for the length of time ai, their belief at the beginning of the ith co®ee break is
^ pi+1.T h es e q u e n c ef^ pig decreases and is bounded below by zero, so there is a limiting
belief, denoted by ^ p1. To deal with possible deviations at beliefs above p¤
1, we will need
to introduce two more beliefs, ^ p¡1 and ^ p¡1=2. These will be determined endogenously
once the sequence of the ai is given. For the moment, all we need to know is that
^ p¡1 > ^ p¡1=2 >p ¤
1.
Given the interval length ¢ and sequences faig1
i=0 and f^ pigi=¡1;¡1=2;0;1;::: as above,
we specify the players' strategies as follows. Always assuming that no success has been
observed so far, we build these strategies recursively from a few basic steps labelled
[Start], [¡2], [¡2D]( D =1 ;2), [¡1], [¡1D]( D =1 ;2), [i]( i =0 ;1;:::), and [End].
The ideas behind these steps are simple. [Start] initialises play by positioning the current
common belief with respect to the grid given by the beliefs f^ pig. If the current belief
is still above ^ p¡1, we enter Step [¡2] where both players are supposed to play the risky
arm until their common belief has decayed to ^ p¡1. If one of the players, say player D,
deviates during Step [¡2], he is eventually punished in Step [¡1D], but this punishment
is delayed (Step [¡2D]) as long as the risky arm is still dominant for either player; this
i st h ec a s ea sl o n ga st h ec o m m o nb e l i e fr e m a i n sa b o v e^ p¡1=2. If the current belief is
between ^ p¡1 and ^ p0,w ee n t e rS t e p[ ¡1] where both players are supposed to play the
risky arm until their common belief has decayed to ^ p0 = p¤
1. If one of the players, say
player D, deviates during Step [¡1], he is punished in Step [¡1D]. This step has player
D play the risky arm whereas the other player free-rides on D's e®ort. The punishment
phase only ends when the common belief has reached p¤
1. O n c eb e l i e f sa r ea to rb e l o w
the one-player cut-o®, we go through Steps [i] corresponding to the intervals described
earlier. Players are supposed to play the risky arm in the ¯rst part of each interval,
and the safe arm in the second part. If a player deviates in the activity phase of an
interval, he is punished in Step [End] where both players switch to the safe arm for
good. Deviations during a break do not trigger punishments: if one player performs
more experimentation than required, his results are evaluated at the end of the break,
beliefs are updated accordingly, and play is re-initialised in Step [Start].
More precisely, the steps and the transitions between them are:
² [Start]: If the current belief is strictly greater then ^ p¡1,g ot oS t e p[ ¡2]. If the current
belief is in [^ p¡1; ^ p0[, go to Step [¡1]. If the current belief is in [^ pi; ^ pi+1[w i t hi ¸ 0, go to
Step [i].
² [¡2]: Let the current time be t.L e t¿¡1 b et h et i m en e e d e df o rt h ec o m m o nb e l i e ft o
reach ^ p¡1 when both players use R all the way. The strategy of both players prescribes
R on [t;t + ¿¡1[. If pt+¿¡1 =^ p¡1,g ot oS t e p[ ¡1]. If pt+¿¡1 > ^ p¡1 and only player D
deviated (i.e., played S on a set of times of positive measure during [t;t + ¿¡1[), go to
Step [¡2D]. If pt+¿¡1 > ^ p¡1 and both players deviated, go to [Start].
² [¡2D]: Let the current time be t.L e t ~ ¿¡1=2 be the time needed for the common
belief to reach ^ p¡1=2 when both players use R all the way. The strategy of both players
prescribes R on [t;t +~ ¿¡1=2[. If pt+~ ¿¡1=2 =^ p¡1=2,g ot oS t e p[ ¡1D]. If pt+~ ¿¡1=2 > ^ p¡1=2
and only player D has ever deviated, repeat Step [¡2D]. If pt+~ ¿¡1=2 > ^ p¡1=2 and both
players have now deviated, go to [Start].
17² [¡1]: Let the current time be t.L e t¿0 b et h et i m en e e d e df o rt h ec o m m o nb e l i e ft o
reach ^ p0 when both players use R all the way. The strategy of both players prescribes R
on [t;t + ¿0[. If pt+¿0 =^ p0,g ot oS t e p[ 0 ] .I fpt+¿0 > ^ p0 and only player D deviated (i.e.,
played S on a set of times of positive measure during [t;t + ¿0[ ) ,g ot oS t e p[ ¡1D]. If
pt+¿0 > ^ p0 and both players deviated, go to [Start].
² [¡1D] :L e tt h ec u r r e n tt i m eb et.L e t~ ¿0 be the time needed for the common belief
to reach ^ p0 when exactly one player uses R all the way. The strategy of player D (the
deviator being punished) prescribes R on [t;t +~ ¿0[. The strategy of player :D (the
one who has carried out the prescribed experimentation in step [¡1]) prescribes S on
[t;t +~ ¿0[. If pt+~ ¿0 =^ p0,g ot oS t e p[ 0 ] .I fpt+~ ¿0 > ^ p0,r e p e a tS t e p[ ¡1D].
² [i]: Let the current time be t.L e t¿i b et h et i m en e e d e df o rt h ec o m m o nb e l i e ft or e a c h
^ pi+1 when both players use R all the way. (Unless the previous step was [Start], ¿i = ai.)
The strategy of both players prescribes R on [t;t+¿i[a n dS on [t+¿i;t+¿i+bi[. (Recall
that bi =¢¡ ai is the length of the ith co®ee break.) If pt+¿i =^ pi+1,g ot o[ Start]a t
time t + ¿i + bi.I fpt+¿i > ^ pi+1 and only one player deviated on [t;t + ¿i[b yp l a y i n gS
on a subset of positive measure, go to [End]a tt i m et + ¿i + bi.I fpt+¿i > ^ pi+1 and both
players deviated in the above sense on [t;t+ ¿i[, go to [Start]a tt i m et + ¿i + bi.
² [End]: The strategy of each player prescribes S forever. All further deviations are
ignored.
To show that these strategies form an equilibrium, it will su±ce to show that no
player has an incentive to deviate in any given step, assuming that the above strategies
are followed in all subsequent steps (this is a variant of the familiar one-stage-deviation
principle). At beliefs above the single-player cut-o® p¤
1,i . e .i nS t e p s[ ¡2], [¡2D], [¡1] and
[¡1D], robustness to deviations will follow from arguments that build on the Markovian
case developed in Section 2. The same holds for Step [End]. As to Steps [i], robustness
to deviations requires that the sequence faig1
i=0 (or, equivalently, f^ pig1
i=1)b ec h o s e ni n
a particular way. Given ¹ a, in fact, we will ¯nd a natural number I such that ai =¹ a
for i · I,a n d ai < ¹ a otherwise. Thus, in the early intervals, the above strategies
have both players experiment as much as possible, and they will strictly prefer following
their strategy to deviating. For all intervals i>I, the players experiment less than the
maximum amount, and they will be just indi®erent between following their strategy and
the most advantageous deviation. This indi®erence imposes a restriction on the beliefs
f^ pig1
i=I+1 in form of a second-order di®erence equation. We can use this equation to
anchor the sequence \at in¯nity", i.e. show existence of a stable solution and provide
bounds on the limit belief ^ p1, and then work backwards towards the endogenously
determined I.
The bounds on ^ p1 will show that, as ¢ tends to zero and the \maximal activity ratio"
¹ a=¢ tends to one, the limit belief tends to the e±cient cut-o® p¤
2.T h i si sq u i t ei n t u i t i v e :
As the intervals become shorter and the intensity of experimentation in the early stages
becomes higher, the players can achieve an amount of experimentation, measured by the
sum of the lengths of time that the players are using the risky arm, arbitrarily close to the
e±cient amount, which is twice the time needed for the initial belief to decay to p¤
2 when
both players use the risky arm all the way through. In the early stages of the equilibrium,
18moreover, the players can achieve an intensity of experimentation arbitrarily close to the
e±cient rate, which is 2. Taken together, these two facts imply that as intervals and co®ee
breaks become shorter, the players' equilibrium payo®s converge to the team solution.
We have the following result.
Proposition 3.1 For any ¢ and ¹ a with 0 < ¹ a<¢, there exists a non-increasing
sequence of positive real numbers faig1
i=0 such that the strategies de¯ned in Steps [Start],
[¡2], [¡2D], [¡1], [¡1D] (D =1 ;2), [i] (i =0 ;1;:::), and [End] constitute a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of the experimentation game with public information. The outcome
of this equilibrium is that the players both use the risky arm whenever their common belief
is above or at the single-player cut-o® p¤
1; otherwise, they alternate jointly between activity
phases (where both use the risky arm) of diminishing length · ¹ a and co®ee breaks (where
both use the safe arm) of increasing length ¸ ¢¡¹ a. Provided no success is observed, the
common belief in this equilibrium converges to a limit ^ p1;a s(¢;
¹ a
¢) ! (0;1), the limit
belief ^ p1 tends to p¤
2 and the players' equilibrium payo®s converge to the two-player team
payo®s.
Proof: S e et h eA p p e n d i x ,w h e r ew ee s t a b l i s ht h es e q u e n c efaig1
i=0 and show that
­(p
¤















The fact that these non-Markovian equilibria of the game with public information
are arbitrarily close to e±cient, stands in sharp contrast to the ine±cient Markovian
equilibria of the previous section. This result is due to the introduction of (in¯nitely
many) co®ee breaks, which promote cooperation. In fact the breaks are arranged so
that the short-run bene¯t of free-riding never exceeds the long-run cost. That is, the
information to be gained from free-riding today is less important than the information
a player knows she will get in the future if her opponent continues to play out the
equilibrium. In particular, the current payo® from a deviation is small because the use
of R within each interval is shrinking su±ciently fast relative to the remaining amount
of experimentation.
4 Equilibria with Private Information
In this section the players' experimental outcomes are private information. Nevertheless,
we show that there is an equilibrium where the players' strategies are similar to those
described in the previous section. Again, the equilibrium payo®s can be made arbitrarily
close to the e±cient ones.
When the players' experimental outcomes are private, but their actions are observ-
able, the inference problem faced by players is severe and intricate. In general all orders
of belief will be important in solving this inference problem. First, consider one player
19observing her opponent's actions. In general, the longer he is observed to use the risky
action, R, the more likely it is that he has received a prize h. Thus without knowing his
experimental results, she will tend to revise her belief about the state upwards as he uses
R for longer. If the observer is using R at the same time as making these observations,
however, the fact that she is using R itself encourages her opponent to use R and to
disregard his own information. If she is to infer the probability of a success correctly,
she must recognise that her own actions will have an encouraging e®ect on her opponent
and reduce the importance he attaches to his own information. This second-order e®ect
can lead to extreme inferences. In some cases she will get no information at all from his
use of R, because he is basing his actions solely on her behaviour. At the same time, he
is choosing to ignore his own information at the expense of the information he believes
he is getting from his opponent. This is a form of herding.
There are two key intuitions about how the players use actions to signal, which are
extensively used in the equilibrium constructed below. Both of these intuitions again
arise out of the co®ee breaks. First, if one player chooses to use R for a ¯xed amount
of time independent of the experimental outcomes, then her opponent cannot deduce
anything from his observations of her actions. By Bayes' Theorem, if a player's actions
are independent of a random variable then his actions must be uninformative about that
random variable. Thus, a ¯xed time spent using R in equilibrium will force a player
to disregard the actions of his opponent and to obtain information only from his own
experimental outcomes. The co®ee breaks divide the players' use of R into ¯xed time
chunks that are independent of their immediate experimental results, which gives players
an incentive to collect observations on their own account. The second role they play is to
coordinate the signalling. At the end of a ¯xed time ai using R the players either switch
to S f o ra na m o u n to ft i m ebi or they continue to use R if they had a prize h.T h u s ,
at the start of a co®ee break a player's action will signal his experimental outcomes to
his opponent. The experimental outcomes of the players are signalled in a simultaneous
burst of information { either no success thus far, or a success. The breaks are the
points at which the players' accumulated information is exchanged. The exchange of
information at the end of the ¯xed period of experimentation delays the inferences the
players make about the information of their opponent and thereby delays their ability to
free-ride on the information acquired by their opponent. They must wait until the next
co®ee break until they can infer what their opponent has observed.
One important question that must be addressed is: do the players have an incentive
to signal correctly when a co®ee break arises? First, does a player have an incentive to
use S during the break when he has received a prize h? Certainly not, because once a
prize has been received it is a strictly dominant strategy to use R at every instant of
time. Beliefs in the equilibrium below will indeed be such that a deviation from R to S
will be considered evidence of failure so far. Second, does a player have an incentive to
continue to use R during the break even when he has not received a prize h during the
previous ai periods? The answer to this question is also no, because of the herding e®ect
described in the earlier paragraph. In fact, the equilibrium that we construct will be
supported by the belief that whoever deviates in this particular way must have received
a prize in the preceding activity phase. In other words, if a player misrepresents his
information in this way his opponent will infer that the state is good and then use R
20forever (disregarding her own observations to the contrary). This harms the deviator,
because his opponent's signals are now entirely uninformative and he cannot obtain any
further information from her actions.
The main result in this section is Proposition 4.1. It shows that the equilibrium
described in Proposition 3.1 essentially carries over to the case where experimental out-
comes are private information, although there are di®erent constraints on the sequence
faig. In the early stages of play both players use R until their `pooled' belief (which
each player calculates assuming that the other has not had a prize so far) approaches the
threshold p¤
1, then they use R for pre-determined short periods of time followed by co®ee
breaks if no success has been observed. We will see that given a sequence faig of lengths
of the activity phases, the payo® from a deviation is lower in the game with private
information than in the game with public information. When a player deviates in the
game with public information he can continue to observe his opponent's experimental
outcomes. However, under private information the player cannot immediately observe
what his opponent's outcomes are. Instead he must wait until the next co®ee break to see
whether his opponent continues to use R or abandons this entirely. Thus there is a delay
in his ability to free-ride on her information acquisition. This delay makes deviation less
attractive under private information. As the payo® to a deviation from the equilibrium
with private information is lower, the players should be willing to experiment more in
the short run at this equilibrium. This suggests that for given ¢ and ¹ a, the equilibria
with private information should have a higher intensity of experimentation, and hence
be more e±cient, than the equilibria with public information.
The construction of equilibrium strategies follows that in the public information case
very closely, with common beliefs replaced by pooled beliefs when it comes to the decision
when to stop for a break. One di®erence is that a deviation from S to R during a break
is not simply ignored; rather, it triggers a reaction whereby the other player revises his
belief to certainty that the state is good and consequently switches to R forever.
Proposition 4.1 For any ¢ and ¹ a with 0 < ¹ a<¢, there exists a non-increasing
sequence of positive real numbers faig1
i=0 such that the following is the outcome of a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game with private information. The players both
use the risky arm whenever their pooled belief is above or at the single-player cut-o® p¤
1;
otherwise, they alternate jointly between activity phases (where both use the risky arm)
of diminishing length · ¹ a and co®ee breaks (where both use the safe arm) of increasing
length ¸ ¢ ¡ ¹ a. Provided no success is observed, the common belief in this equilibrium
converges to a limit ^ p1;a s(¢;
¹ a
¢) ! (0;1), the limit belief ^ p1 tends to p¤
2 and the
players' equilibrium payo®s converge to the two-player team payo®s.




















One issue that arises in games of private information is the formation of beliefs o® the
equilibrium path. If player 1 deviates from the above equilibrium by using S instead of R,
21player 2 infers that player 1's experimentation before the deviation had been unsuccessful.
Although, this inference seems intuitively appealing it may be that the equilibrium is not
robust to a di®erent inference from such a deviation. If beliefs were revised so that such
a deviation leads player 2 to conclude that player 1's experiments were successful, then
player 2 would play R forever believing that it was good. Player 1 then derives no further
bene¯t from the presence of player 2 and cannot see player 2's experimental results. The
deviation would be very harmful to player 1 and the equilibrium would be robust to this
alternative inference. The worst belief player 2 can have (from player 1's perspective) is
to be convinced the state is good, because then player 1 gets no more information from
player 2. Using these beliefs o® the equilibrium path makes building equilibria much
easier, but it is counter-intuitive: if player 1 really had had a success then she could never
bene¯t by deviating; however, if her experimentation had been unsuccessful she could
conceivably bene¯t. This argument suggests that the alternative beliefs revision process
is inconsistent with the spirit of a number of equilibrium re¯nements. Consequently, we
do not consider equilibria that use this type of belief revision.
On the other hand, in the above equilibrium a player witnessing a deviation from S
to R is supposed to conclude that the deviator has had a success in the previous activity
phase. A jump in beliefs to full subjective certainty seems an extreme assumption to
make. In fact, this assumption is not necessary: a belief jumping su±ciently close, but
not all the way, to certainty will do as well. A deviation from S to R will then imply
that the other player switches to R for a ¯nite period of time. All we have to ensure is
that this period is su±ciently long to deter this type of deviation.
5 How General are these Results?
There are some trivial and obvious generalisations of the model that follow with very little
additional work. First, none of the arguments requires only two players so the results
are robust to many players. Secondly, the results apply to bandit problems where the
known arm generates a stationary non-deterministic stream of payo®s { we can simply
reinterpret s as the expected °ow payo®.
At ¯rst sight the results appear to be very dependent on the speci¯cation of the
process for the risky arm. However, a more careful investigation reveals that suitably
amended versions of the propositions apply to other bandit problems too. Suppose that
the risky arm is in one of two states both of which generate Poisson rewards, and that
in the good state the Poisson rewards arrive more frequently than in the bad state.
In this case, whenever a reward arrives the belief jumps upwards but never hits unity;
when a reward does not arrive the belief decays, as before. With public information a
version of the co®ee-break equilibrium can be built: for high beliefs both players use R
and for lower beliefs they use the risky arm intermittently, the payo® from doing this
again being the future experimental input from their opponent and the possibility of an
upward jump in the belief. A direct translation of the equilibrium can be constructed
provided the arrival of a reward leads the belief to jump above the one-player threshold
p¤
1; if this fails it is necessary to de¯ne a new co®ee-break equilibrium that is played out
after each upward jump. With private information it is harder to generalise the results
22here in a simple way. The intuition that the ¯xed period spent using the risky arm is
uninformative still holds true, but in this case the players in general need to signal not
only whether a reward has arrived but also the number of rewards, and it is harder to
s e eh o wt h ep l a y e r sc a ns i g n a lt h enumber of rewards when they have only two actions
{ one resolution is to make the intervals small, in which case the probability of two
or more arrivals in any activity phase is negligible relative to the probability of there
being just one arrival. The next issue is the incentive-compatibility of the signalling:
would a player necessarily want to turn up for a co®ee break? By signalling an arrival a
player will in general lead her opponent to use R for a longer time without pooling any
information. This will be harmful to the signaller and may well deter false arrival signals
provided the signaller cannot herself free-ride on this extra experimental e®ort from her
opponent. Taking a break when an arrival occurred is also harmful because the break
requires the player to take a sub-optimal action. Thus at least in the domain of Poisson
bandits the results do seem to generalise.
The ¯nal generalisation we consider is to a multi-armed bandit. In this case the
players can take the equilibrium strategies above and apply them to the safe arm and
one of the risky arms at a time, using the safe arm for the co®ee breaks. Instead of
switching to the safe arm at the end of the trials with the sole risky arm, they just
switch to the next risky arm that needs to be investigated according to the familiar
Gittins index rule.
23Appendix
Proof(s) from Section 2
Proof of Proposition 2.5: First note that each player's value function is continuous as
a function of p and takes the value ¸h at p =1a n ds at p = 0; moreover it is di®erentiable
wherever he/she chooses optimally to switch (from playing R to playing S,o rvice versa)a n d
the other player does not switch { if the right derivative is smaller, the player should switch at
a larger p; if the right derivative is larger, the player should switch at a smaller p.
Our aim is to show that the region bounded below by the myopic payo® in the (p;u)-plane
contains three regions, as in Figure 1. In one region (when the players are optimistic) it is
dominant for each of them to play R a n di na n o t h e rr e g i o n( w h e nt h ep l a y e r sa r ep e s s i m i s t i c
























Figure 1: Three regions
The solid kinked line is the payo® from the myopic strategy.
Assume that player n's continuation value is given by un(p).
² Assume that player A (she) is playing R w h e nt h eb e l i e fi si ns o m ei n t e r v a l[ p`;p r], and
consider the best response of player B (he) on [p`;p c] µ [p`;p r]. If it is also R then his value
function on [p`;p c]i sg i v e nb yV2 from equation (10) with V2(p`)=uB(p`); if his best response
is S then his value function on [p`;p c]i sg i v e nb yF1 from equation (12) with F1(p`)=uB(p`).
Now, if V2(p)=F1(p)=u,s a y ,t h e nV 0
2(p) >F 0
1(p)i fu>2s ¡ ¸hp,a n dV 0
2(p) <F 0
1(p)i f
u<2s¡¸hp.T h u s ,i fuB(p`) > 2s¡¸hp`, then his best response to R is to \join in" by playing
R on [p`;p r]; if uB(p`) < 2s¡ ¸hp`, then his best response to R is to free-ride by playing S on
24[p`;p c]f o ra n ypc such that F1(pc) < 2s ¡ ¸hpc; and he can only switch optimally at a belief
pc 2 [p`;p r]w h e r e( pc;u B(pc)) 2D 1.
² Now, assume that player A (she) is playing S when the belief is in some interval [p`;p r],
and consider the best response of player B (he) on [p`;p c] µ [p`;p r]. If it is R then his value
function on [p`;p c]i sg i v e nb yV1 from equation (2) with V1(p`)=uB(p`); if his best response
is also S t h e nt h eb e l i e fn ol o n g e rc h a n g e s ,s oi tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tuB(p`)=s and his value
function on [p`;p c]i ss i m p l ys.N o w , i f V1(p)=s,t h e nV 0
1(p) > 0i fp>p ¤
1,a n dV 0
1(p) < 0
if p<p ¤
1.T h u s , i f uB(p`)=s, then his best response to S is to act unilaterally: if p` >p ¤
1
then play R on [p`;p r]; if p` <p ¤
1 then play S on [p`;p c] for any pc such that pc <p ¤
1;a n dh e
can only switch optimally at the belief p¤
1. However, if uB(p`) >s , then his best response to S
must be to play R on [p`;p r] (but note that V 0
1(p) < 0i f( r +¸p)V1(p) > (r + ¸)¸hp).
Let ¹ pr denote the smallest belief where each player's continuation value is (weakly) above D1,
and let ¹ p` denote the largest belief where each player's continuation value is (weakly) below
D1; necessarily, p¤
1 < ¹ p` · ¹ pr <p m.
For a belief in a neighbourhood of 1, speci¯cally p 2 (¹ pr;1], R is the dominant strategy;
and for a belief in a neighbourhood of 0, speci¯cally p 2 [0;p ¤
1], S is the dominant strategy.
(We know that un(0) = s,a n ds oS is a dominant response on any interval [0;p c] µ [0;p ¤
1]).
For beliefs p 2 (p¤
1; ¹ p`], the best response to S is to play R (act unilaterally), and the best
response to R is to play S (free-ride). Now consider beliefs p 2 (¹ p`; ¹ pr]; let A be the player
whose continuation value crosses D1 at ¹ p` and let B be the player whose continuation value
crosses D1 at ¹ pr.I fB plays S,t h e nA's best response is to play R (act unilaterally), and if B
plays R,t h e nA's best response is to play R (\join in"); thus R is the dominant response for
A. So, given A plays R, B's best response is to play S (free-ride). To summarise:
Belief p 0 p¤
1 ¹ p` ¹ pr 1
A's strategy SS = R RR
B's strategy SR = S SR
A's continuation value sF 1;A=V1;A V1;A V2;A
B's continuation value sV 1;B=F1;B F1;B V2;B
and the strategies on (p¤
1; ¹ p`] determine ¹ p` endogenously, which player plays R and which player
plays S on (¹ p`; ¹ pr], and ¹ pr endogenously. If the players have the above continuation values, then
the above strategies are best responses to each other; and if the players are using the above
strategies, then the continuation values are indeed those given above. Thus the above strategies
constitute an equilibrium with the equilibrium value functions given by the continuation values.
The `simplest' equilibrium is where one player, say player 1, plays S on (p¤
1; ~ p`], and the
other player, player 2, plays R on this interval. Then player 1's value function F1 satis¯es







1), since whenever F1(p)=V1(p)=u,s a y ,F0
1(p) >V0
1(p)i ®¸hp < s,i . e .i ®
p<p m. Furthermore, it can be shown that F1 is concave and V1 is convex8 and so if F1 and V1
take the same value again, say at pc >p ¤
1,t h e nF0
1(pc) · V 0
1(pc), which implies that pc ¸ pm.
This shows that F1 meets D1 at a smaller belief than does V1,a n dt h a tF1 >V 1 on (p¤
1; ~ p`];
that is, player 1 must be A a n ds w i t c hf r o mp l a y i n gR on (~ p`; ~ pr], and player 2 must be B and
8It transpires that the second derivative of the functions F1, V1 and V2 has the same sign as the
constant of integration (in (12), (2) and (10) respectively) and thus the convexity/concavity of the
solution is determined by that sign.
25switch from playing S on (~ p`; ~ pr]. This equilibrium is thus given by:
Belief p 0 p¤
1 ~ p` ~ pr 1
A's strategy SS R R
B's strategy SR S R
A's value function sF 1;A V1;A V2;A
B's value function sV 1;B F1;B V2;B
and the components of the value functions, and the switch-points, are determined as follows:
(1) C in F1;A from F1;A(p¤
1)=s
(2) C in V1;B from V1;B(p¤
1)=s
(3) ~ p` from F1;A(~ p`)=2 s ¡ ¸h~ p`
(4) C in V1;A from V1;A(~ p`)=F1;A(~ p`)=2 s ¡ ¸h~ p`
(5) C in F1;B from F1;B(~ p`)=V1;B(~ p`)
(6) ~ pr from F1;B(~ pr)=2 s ¡ ¸h~ pr
(7) C in V2;A from V2;A(~ pr)=V1;A(~ pr)
(8) C in V2;B from V2;B(~ pr)=F1;B(~ pr)=2 s ¡ ¸h~ pr
Note that the boundary condition at p = 1 is automatically satis¯ed because V2;A(1) =
V2;B(1) = ¸h regardless of the constants of integration.
Noting that when V2(p)=V1(p)=u,s a y ,V 0
2(p) >V0
1(p)i ®u>¸ h p(the payo® from always















Thus, as the common belief decays, B switches smoothly from R to S against R at ~ pr (where
A has a kink), both A and B switch at ~ p` (each with a kink), and B switches smoothly again
from R to S against S at p¤
1 (where A again has a kink).
Following steps (1) and (3) determines the equation for ~ p` g i v e ni nt h es t a t e m e n to ft h e
proposition; following steps (2), (5) and (6) determines the equation for ~ pr g i v e ni nt h es t a t e -
ment of the proposition; the remaining steps are for completeness only.9
Other equilibria for the two-player strategic problem
Any ¯nite partition of the interval to the right of p¤
1 can be used to construct a pure strategy
equilibrium of the two-player strategic problem.
Take any ¯nite (measurable) partition of (p¤
1;p m] and divide this into two subsets In,
n =1 ;2. Build the continuous functions Xn on [p¤
1;p m] as follows: Xn(p¤
1)=s, Xn satis-
¯es equation (12) on In (free-rider), Xn satis¯es equation (2) on I:n (lone ranger).
De¯ne ¹ p` =m i nfp 2 [p¤
1;p m]:X1(p)_ X2(p)=2 s ¡ ¸hpg.I fXn(¹ p`) ¸ X:n(¹ p`)t h e nA =
n,e l s eA = :n; B = :A.
De¯ne ¹ pr by XB(¹ pr)=2 s ¡ ¸h¹ pr,s o¹ p` · ¹ pr.
Now take the partition J1 [J2 of (p¤
1; ¹ p`], where Jn = fp · ¹ p` : p 2 Ing,i . e .Jn and In agree on
(p¤
1; ¹ p`].
9Details are available from the authors on request.
26Let A's strategy be as follows:
play S on [0;p ¤
1]; play S on JA and R on JB;p l a yR on (¹ p`; ¹ pr]; play R on (¹ pr;1].
Let B's strategy be as follows:
play S on [0;p ¤
1]; play R on JA and S on JB;p l a yS on (¹ p`; ¹ pr]; play R on (¹ pr;1].
Build the continuous functions Yn on [0;1] as follows:
YA(p)=s on [0;p ¤
1]; YA satis¯es equation (12) on JA (free-rider) and satis¯es equation (2)
on JB (lone ranger); YA satis¯es equation (2) on (¹ p`; ¹ pr] (lone ranger); YA satis¯es equation (10)
on (¹ pr;1].
YB(p)=s on [0;p ¤
1]; YB satis¯es equation (2) on JA (lone ranger) and satis¯es equation (12)
on JB (free-rider); YB satis¯es equation (12) on (¹ p`; ¹ pr]( f r e e - r i d e r ) ;YB satis¯es equation (10)
on (¹ pr;1].
If the continuation values are given by Yn, then the above strategies are best responses to
each other; and if the players are using the above strategies, then the continuation values are
indeed given by Yn. Thus the above strategies constitute an equilibrium with the equilibrium
value functions given by Yn.
YA and YB lie between F1;A and V1;B [ F1;B below and to the left of D1.T h u s~ p` · ¹ p` ·
¹ pr · ~ pr, and so the `simplest' equilibrium exhibits the least experimentation.
Proof(s) from Section 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1: We focus on the case where the belief has reached p¤
1 and
consider Steps [i]( i =0 ;1;:::).
De¯ne x(p)=­ ( p)=­(pm), the normalised odds ratio when the belief is p. We will establish
an increasing convergent sequence fxig1
i=0 from which we can retrieve the decreasing sequence
of beliefs by inverting xi = x(^ pi), so x0 =­ ( p¤
1)=­(pm)=( r + ¸)=¸. Also de¯ne the sequence
fyig1
i=0 by yi = xi=xi+1,s oyi = e¡2¸a i, from which we can retrieve the length of each \activity
phase". The restrictions ai · ¹ a<¢ obviously cascade onto restrictions on xi.
Let ± = e¡r¢ < 1 be the discount factor for an interval of length ¢; let ¯ = e¡r¹ a >±be
the discount factor for a subinterval of length ¹ a;a n dl e t° = r=2¸, the exponent of the odds
ratio in the payo® function of an agent when there are 2 players experimenting.
Let the common belief be ^ pi. Assume that player 2 (he) will play R for the next ai periods,
followed by S for the subsequent bi periods if no lump-sum arrives. (If the other player has
done likewise, he will continue; but if the other player has deviated, he will stop and play S
forever.) The ¯rst step is to calculate the payo® Ei of player 1 (she) when she uses the same
strategy, and then her payo® Di when she deviates by playing S for the ¯rst ai periods.
When both players play R, the common belief at the end of ai periods will be ^ pi+1,a n d
her payo® during this time is given by (10), that is
























¶° Ei(^ pi+1)¡ s
s(1¡ ^ pi+1)
: (A.1)
When both players switch to S, the common belief at the end of bi periods will still be ^ pi+1,




re ¡rtsdt+e¡rb i ui+1(^ pi+1)
27or equivalently Ei(^ pi+1)¡ s = e¡rb i(ui+1(^ pi+1)¡ s). Using this in equation (A.1), we see that
Ei(^ pi) ¡ s













i e¡rb iui+1(^ pi+1) ¡ s
s(1 ¡ ^ pi+1)
;
and using the fact that y
°
i e¡rb i = ± the above equation becomes
Ei(^ pi) ¡ s









¡ [1 ¡ y
°
i ]+±
ui+1(^ pi+1) ¡ s
s(1 ¡ ^ pi+1)
: (A.2)
If player 1 deviates by playing S (free-riding) for the ¯rst ai periods and if no lump-
sum arrives, then player 2 will stop, both players will play S forever and get a payo® of
s. Because only one player has been using R, the players' belief has decayed to pi+1=2 =
























!2° Di(pi+1=2) ¡ s
s(1 ¡ pi+1=2)
: (A.3)
But Di(pi+1=2)=s and xi=x(pi+1=2)=( xi=xi+1)
1=2, which leads to the payo® from the devia-
tion














For deviation not to be optimal, Di(^ pi) · Ei(^ pi)f o ra l li. From equations (A.4) and (A.2),





















i ] · ±U i+1(^ pi+1) (A.5)
for all i, where the term on the RHS denotes the ¯nal term in equation (A.2). The condi-
tion (A.5) is su±cient to show that no deviation is optimal, because any deviation that occurs
later than the start of an interval yields the deviator a lower payo® from deviation.
Clearly the sequence xi = x0 (so yi = 1) for all i satis¯es condition (A.5), but we shall
generate an increasing sequence such that xi (and thus ai) is as large as possible. It may be that
for low values of i condition (A.5) is a strict inequality10 (when ai will be at its maximum),
and for i larger than some critical value I, condition (A.5) holds with equality (when ai will
be less than its maximum).
The LHS of condition (A.5) is 0 when xi+1 = xi, and its ¯rst derivative with respect to
xi+1 has the same sign as ¸(xi+1=xi)
1
2 ¡(r+2¸)+rxi+1.W h e nxi+1 = xi,t h i si sg r e a t e rt h a n
o re q u a lt o0i ®rxi ¸ r +¸, and the second derivative with respect to xi+1 is strictly positive.
Since rx0 = r + ¸, it follows by induction that the LHS of condition (A.5) is increasing in
xi+1. This enables us to de¯ne xi+1 recursively as follows. Set xi+1 = ¯¡1=°xi (corresponding
to ai =¹ a) if this does not violate condition (A.5), else set xi+1 <¯ ¡1=°xi (corresponding to
ai < ¹ a) so that condition (A.5) holds with equality.
De¯ne I as the smallest integer such that it holds with equality. For i<Ideviation
is strictly suboptimal, whereas for i ¸ I she is indi®erent and so we can use the payo® to
10It should hold strictly for i =0i fw et a k e± and ¯ uniformly closer to 1.
28ad e v i a t i o n( Di+1(^ pi+1) { see equation (A.4)) to replace the continuation payo® (implicitly

































for i ¸ I.
Consider the equality when i = I. As the LHS is increasing in xi+1, if we replace xI+1 by


























l e a d i n gt oal o w e rb o u n df o rxI when ± and ¯ are close to 1 (i.e. when ¢ and ¹ a are close to 0):
xI ¸ x(p¤




Having constructed the increasing sequence fxigI
i=0, we have to show that there exists an
increasing sequence fxig1
i=I+1 that satis¯es condition (A.6) and converges to a ¯nite limit ».
We have already seen that the LHS of the condition is positive when xi+1 >x i >x 0,i m p l y i n g
that the RHS is also positive and so xi+2 >x i+1. By induction, any sequence that satis¯es
condition (A.6) will be increasing if xI+1 >x I.


































which has a steady state at (x;y)=( »;1) for any ». The linear approximation to this system






















The point (»;1) is a non-hyperbolic steady state (Devaney 1987), since one of the eigenvalues
of this linear approximation is unity. We show that there exists a sequence f(xi;y i)g converging
to (»;1) provided that the other eigenvalue of this system is strictly between 0 and 1. This is







The lower bound is simply x0, and is satis¯ed because xi is increasing. The upper bound is
equal to x(p¤
2)¡ (1 ¡ ±)¸=r.
If condition (A.7) holds, then the Mean Value Theorem and the above linear approximation
to yi+1 imply that there exists ²>0a n d0<®<1 such that (1¡yi+1) <® (1¡yi) for all (xi;y i)
for which k(xi;y i)¡(»;1)k <² .T h es e q u e n c efyig is converging to unity as long as (xi;y i)i si n
this neighbourhood, but it may be that at some point the xi coordinate becomes further than
² away from » and so the sequence leaves the neighbourhood. We will use induction to show
that this cannot happen. Choose (xi;y i)s ot h a tk(xi;y i)¡(»;1)k <C² (1¡®) and assume that
11In general, it will be strict; however, it will be weak in the knife-edge case where xI+1 = ¯¡1=°xI.
29for i = i +1 ;:::;j¡ 1 the sequence (xi;y i) does not leave this neighbourhood; we will then
































(1 ¡ yi) <C ²
(The ¯rst line applies the de¯nition of yi; the second line uses the fact that (1¡yi+1) <® (1¡yi)
in the neighbourhood; the third line uses ln(1 + x) · x; the ¯nal line applies (1 ¡ yi+m) <
®m(1¡yi) and then uses the initial assertion.) If C<1=», the inequality ln(xj=xi) <C²implies
that xj <»+² for small ².T h u syi converges to unity, xi is increasing and thus also converges
to ». By working backwards from a neighbourhood of the steady state to the initial condition
xI+1 >¯ ¡I=°x0, we have shown that there is an increasing solution to condition (A.6) such
that limi!1xi = » for any » satisfying condition (A.7).
Proof(s) from Section 4
Proof of Proposition 4.1: We again focus on the case where the belief has reached p¤
1 and
consider Steps [i]( i =0 ;1;:::).
For the case of private information (unobservable outcomes), we retain the de¯nition of
x(p) and will establish a (di®erent) increasing convergent sequence fxig1
i=0.A s b e f o r e x0 =
­(p¤
1)=­(pm)=( r +¸)=¸, yi = xi=xi+1, and the proof has a similar structure.
Let the common belief be ^ pi. Assume that player 2 (he) will play R for the next ai periods,
followed by S for the subsequent bi periods if no lump-sum arrives. (If the other player has
done likewise, he will continue; but if the other player has deviated, he will stop and play S
forever.) The ¯rst step is to calculate the payo® Ei of player 1 (she) when she uses the same
strategy, and then her payo® Di when she deviates by playing S for the ¯rst ai periods.
When both players play R for the ¯rst ai periods and then neither continues to play R
(thereby signalling no success), the common belief will become ^ pi+1. The expected payo® from
playing this strategy, Ei(^ pi), is the same as that calculated in Proposition 3.1:
Ei(^ pi) ¡ s









¡ [1 ¡ y
°
i ]+±
ui+1(^ pi+1) ¡ s
s(1 ¡ ^ pi+1)
: (A.8)
This is because the players are in e®ect playing the same strategy as before: if either has a
success, they keep on playing R; if neither has a success, they take a break by playing S.I nt h e
private information case where one of them has a success, the other one takes an instantaneous
break but reverts immediately and was playing the appropriate arm in the periods preceding
the prescribed break.12
12A more formal argument is as follows. When player 1 plays R,h e rb e l i e fa tt h ee n do fai periods
will be pi+1=2 =^ pie¡¸a i=(1 ¡ ^ pi +^ pie¡¸a i), and her payo® during this time is given by (2), that is
Ei(p)=¸hp +Ci(1 ¡ p)­(p)2°;p i+1=2 · p · ^ pi ;
30If player 1 deviates by playing S for the ¯rst ai periods and if no lump-sum arrives (for
player 2), then player 2 will stop, both players will play S forever and get a payo® of s; however,
if a lump-sum arrives (for player 2), then player 2 will continue to play R (thereby signalling
success), both players will play R forever and get a payo® of ¸h. Player 1's expected payo®




re ¡rtsdt+ e¡ra i [(1 ¡ ¼i)s + ¼i¸h]
or equivalently (Di(^ pi) ¡ s)=s = e¡ra i ¼i­(pm), where ¼i is the subjective probability that
player 1 attaches to a success for player 2 having occurred during ai periods given her current
(unchanged) belief ^ pi.N o w¼i =^ pi(1 ¡ e¡¸a i) and using the fact that yi = e¡2¸a i leads to the
payo® from the deviation
Di(^ pi) ¡ s














(Note that this is less than equation (A.4), so the payo® to deviation with private information
is less than the payo® to deviation with public information.)
For deviation not to be optimal, Di(^ pi) · Ei(^ pi)f o ra l li. From equations (A.9) and (A.8),






















i ] · ±U i+1(^ pi+1) (A.10)
for all i, where the term on the RHS denotes the ¯nal term in equation (A.8).
As before, the sequence xi = x0 (so yi = 1) for all i satis¯es condition (A.10), but we shall
generate an increasing sequence such that xi (and thus ai) is as large as possible: for low values
of i condition (A.10) is a strict inequality (when ai will be at its maximum), and for i larger
than some critical value J, condition (A.10) holds with equality (when ai will be less than its
maximum).
The LHS of condition (A.10) is 0 when xi+1 = xi, and its ¯rst derivative with respect to
xi+1 has the same sign as ¡r(xi+1=xi)+(r+¸)(xi+1=xi)
1
2 ¡(r+2¸)+rxi+1.W h e nxi+1 = xi,
this is greater than or equal to 0 i® rxi ¸ r + ¸, and the second derivative with respect
to xi+1 is strictly positive. AS before, since rx0 = r + ¸, it follows by induction that the
LHS of condition (A.10) is increasing in xi+1, which enables us to de¯ne xi+1 recursively with
xi+1 = ¯¡1=°xi (corresponding to ai =¹ a) if this does not violate condition (A.10), or else
























¶2° Ei(pi+1=2) ¡ s
s(1 ¡ pi+1=2)
;
where xi+1=2 = x(pi+1=2). At the break time, the common belief either jumps to 1 with a continuation
value of ¸h,o ri sr e v i s e dd o w nt o^ pi+1 with a continuation value rising to ui+1(^ pi+1) by the end of the
break, where





¡rb i ui+1(^ pi+1)
#
or equivalently Ei(^ pi+1=2)¡ s = ¼i+1=2[¸h¡ s]+( 1¡ ¼i+1=2)e¡rb i(ui+1(^ pi+1) ¡ s), where ¼i+1=2 is the
subjective probability that player 1 attaches to a success for player 2 having occurred during ai periods
given her current belief ^ pi+1=2.N o w¼i+1=2 = pi+1=2(1¡e¡¸a i) and using the fact that yi = e¡2¸a i and
xi=x(pi+1=2)=y
1=2
i leads to the payo® given in equation (A.8).
31De¯ne J as the smallest integer such that it holds with equality. For i<Jdeviation
is strictly suboptimal, whereas for i ¸ J she is indi®erent and so we can use the payo® to
ad e v i a t i o n( Di+1(^ pi+1) { see equation (A.9)) to replace the continuation payo® (implicitly



































for i ¸ J.
Consider the equality when i = J.A st h eL H Si si n c r e a s i n gi nxi+1,i fw er e p l a c exJ+1 by


























l e a d i n gt oal o w e rb o u n df o rxJ when ± and ¯ are close to 1 (i.e. when ¢ and ¹ a are close to 0):
xJ ¸ x(p¤




This bound is the same as the bound in Proposition 3.1 for the public information case.
Having constructed the increasing sequence fxigJ
i=0,a sb e f o r ew eh a v et os h o wt h a tt h e r ee x i s t s
an increasing sequence fxig1
i=J+1 that satis¯es condition (A.11) and converges to a ¯nite limit
». By induction, as before, any sequence that satis¯es condition (A.11) will be increasing if
xJ+1 >x J.




































which has a steady state at (x;y)=( »;1) for any ». The linear approximation to this system






















Since this linearisation is exactly the same as for the public information case, the remainder of
the proof concerning the sequence fxig1
i=0 replicates that of Proposition 3.1.
13Again, it will be strict except in the knife-edge case where xJ+1 = ¯¡1=°xJ.
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